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AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
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SUBJECT: ITALY: A MORE ACTIVIST POLICY TOWARD ROGUES

REF: (A) ROME 167; (B) ROME 269; (C) ROME 565; (D) ROME 2005;  
(E) ROME 4433; (F) ROME 3754; (G) ROME 4195; (H) ROME 2752  
(AND PREVIOUS); (K) ROME 3498; (L) ROME 1952; (M) ROME 2566;  
(N) 96ROME12210; (O) 96ROME10301; (P) ROME 4641 (Q) 96ROME 9494

CLASSIFIED BY: DCM JAMES CUNNINGHAM. REASON 1.5 (B)(D).

11. (C) SUMMARY: RECENT GOI ACTIVITY SUGGESTS ITALY IS PURSUING MORE ACTIVIST POLICIES TOWARD THE SO-CALLED "ROGUE" STATES: IRAN, IRAQ, AND LIBYA. ACCORDING TO THE MFA, ITALY HAS, IN FACT, A SINGLE, BROAD POLICY FOR THESE COUNTRIES, CENTERED UPON THE BELIEF THAT ENGAGEMENT, NOT ISOLATION, IS THE BEST WAY TO MODERATE "ROGUE" BEHAVIOR AND SPURRED ON BY THE DESIRE TO PROMOTE FUTURE ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL TIES AS WELL AS SECURE ITALIAN ENERGY SUPPLIES. FOREIGN MINISTER DINI HAS SAID ISOLATING TEHRAN, BAGHDAD, AND TRIPOLI WILL NOT SOLVE ANYTHING -- AND THAT A "GLOBAL AND PRODUCTIVE APPROACH BASED ON DIALOGUE" IS NEEDED. ITALY'S DESIRE TO EXPAND COMMERCIAL TIES, ALONG WITH ITS ENERGY DEPENDENCE, COMPLEMENT DINI'S PERSPECTIVE. THE GOI KNOWS THAT ITS POSITIONS VIS-A-VIS IRAN, IRAQ, AND LIBYA IRRITATE THE U.S., AND HAS BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO PUSH THE ENVELOPE TOO FAR. ITALY BELIEVES ITS POLICIES ARE IN LINE WITH THE ACTIONS OF OTHER EU MEMBERS, SUCH AS GERMANY AND FRANCE, AND IS NEWLY WILLING TO CHARACTERIZE POLICY DIFFERENCES WITH THE U.S. AS "IRRECONCILABLE." WE ARE NOT GOING TO FIND MUCH TO AGREE ON WHEN WE GET BEYOND GENERALITIES. WE HAVE HAD SUCCESS, NONETHELESS, IN DEFLECTING ITALIAN POLICY, AND BY CONTINUING TO LEAN INTO ITALIAN POLITICIANS, AND BY REMINDING THEM OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, WE CAN CONTINUE TO CONDITION ITALIAN BEHAVIOR...UP TO A POINT. END SUMMARY.

DINI'S PERSPECTIVE  
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12. (U) FM DINI OUTLINED HIS VIEW TOWARD THE ROGUE STATES IN A DECEMBER 1996 ARTICLE (WRITTEN BY MFA MIDDLE EAST DIRECTOR CLAUDIO PACIFICO AND HIS DEPUTY, DIEGO BRASIOLI) IN THE TRADE MAGAZINE "ENERGY." IN SHORT, DINI SAID THAT ISOLATING IRAN, IRAQ, AND LIBYA BEHIND "HIGH WALLS OF SAND" WILL NOT SOLVE ANYTHING -- AND THAT A "GLOBAL AND PRODUCTIVE APPROACH BASED ON DIALOGUE" IS NEEDED. OTHERWISE, HE ARGUED, THERE'S A RISK THAT A DIVIDE WILL DEVELOP ON "DEMOGRAPHIC, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC" LINES BETWEEN THE TWO SHORES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN. DINI OUTLINED THE "INTERESTS IN PLAY," NOTING THAT SIX OF ITALY'S TOP SEVEN OIL SUPPLIERS ARE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.

IRAN: MYKONOS DELAYS REOPENING?  
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13. (C) THE MYKONOS TRIAL VERDICTS HAVE INTERRUPTED THE EU'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN, AND HAVE SLOWED -- FOR NOW -- ITALY'S PUSH FOR BROADER ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONS THERE. THE GOI

WAS NOT DISPLEASED TO FIND ITSELF FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME IN MAY AS THE ONLY EU PARTNER WITH AN AMBASSADOR IN PLACE BUT WAS DEEPLY PUZZLED BY IRANIAN FM VELAYATI'S REFUSAL TO SEE AMBASSADOR ORTONA. (NOTE: ORTONA WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RECALLED TO SUPPORT EU SOLIDARITY.) IN JANUARY, VELAYATI MADE A HIGHLY PUBLICIZED TRIP TO ROME WHERE HE MET WITH PRIME MINISTER PRODI AND DINI (REFS A-B). THE APPARENT PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WAS TO RELAUNCH BILATERAL ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS. ONE PRESS REPORT INDICATED THAT POLITICAL APPROVAL HAD BEEN GIVEN FOR A GRADUAL AND LIMITED OPENING OF EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE BY ITALY'S EXPORT CREDIT AGENCY, SACE. VELAYATI TOLD THE PRESS THAT "ITALY CAN BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT COMMERCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PARTNERS OF IRAN." ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, IRAN WOULD OFFER ITALY CONTRACTS FOR USD 12 BILLION AS PART OF IRAN'S 1995-2000 DEVELOPMENT PLAN.

14. (C) BEFORE THE MYKONOS VERDICTS, THE GOI WAS EXPLORING HOW IT MIGHT REOPEN OFFICIAL TRADE CREDITS TO TEHRAN WITHOUT UPSETTING THE U.S. (REF C). AMONG THE OPTIONS, THE MFA WAS WEIGHING ROLLING OVER IRANIAN DEBT REPAYMENTS INTO NEW TRADE COVERAGE TO BOOST EXPORTS AND TO HELP EASE ITALY'S USD 1.2 BILLION TRADE IMBALANCE WITH IRAN, AS WELL AS TO AVOID DISRUPTION OF IRAN'S DEBT REPAYMENTS TO ITALY. IN ADDITION, THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE HAD BEEN PREPARING TO LEAD AN ITALIAN DELEGATION TO THE FIRST MEETING IN SEVEN YEARS OF THE ITALIAN-IRANIAN MIXED ECONOMIC COMMISSION IN TEHRAN (REF D). MFA "NEA" ECONOMIC DIRECTOR FRANCESCO TRUPIANO TOLD EMBOFFS IN MID-MAY THAT BECAUSE OF MYKONOS, THE GOI WAS NOT/NOT CONSIDERING NEW OFFICIAL CREDITS (INCLUDING ROLLING OVER REPAYMENTS) AND THAT THE MIXED COMMISSION WAS INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED. TRUPIANO CONFIRMED THIS WAS STILL THE CASE JUNE 5, NOTING THAT HE DISAGREED WITH ITALIAN PRESS REPORTS THAT THE RECENT IRANIAN ELECTION REPRESENTED A MAJOR POSITIVE CHANGE; HE WILL WANT TO WAIT AND SEE HOW IRANIAN POLICIES ACTUALLY CHANGE IN PRACTICE BEFORE MAKING SUCH A CONCLUSION. IF POLITICAL CONDITIONS DO IN FACT IMPROVE, HE SAID, THE GOI WILL RE-EXAMINE THE QUESTION OF EXPORT CREDITS.

15. (C) DESPITE THE MAY 19 SECOND RECALL OF AMBASSADOR ORTONA FROM IRAN (REF E), ORTONA'S INITIAL QUICK RETURN TO IRAN AFTER MYKONOS ILLUSTRATES GOI DESIRE TO RESUME BUSINESS AS USUAL WITH TEHRAN. BEFORE ORTONA'S RETURN, MFA OFFICIAL TRUPIANO TOLD EMBOFFS THAT HE PERSONALLY HOPED ORTONA WOULD REMAIN IN TEHRAN -- IF ONLY FOR ECONOMIC REASONS. ANOTHER MFA POLITICAL DIRECTORATE SOURCE TOLD US ITALY HOPED, BY KEEPING ORTONA IN PLACE, EVEN TO PICK UP LUCRATIVE CONTRACTS GERMAN COMPANIES MAY LOSE BECAUSE OF THE FREEZE IN GERMAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS. TRUPIANO REITERATED FAMILIAR MFA THEMES THAT IRAN OWES 4.5 TRILLION LIRE (USD 3 BILLION) TO SACE, PLUS ANOTHER USD 1 BILLION TO ITALIAN FIRMS FROM THE SHAH PERIOD. FOR THE MOMENT, IRAN IS MEETING ITS DEBT REPAYMENTS IN FULL -- INCLUDING PRINCIPAL -- BUT IF ITALY PULLS BACK FROM IRAN, IT FEARS TEHRAN WILL CUT ITS REPAYMENTS. TRUPIANO COMMENTED THAT IT WAS EASY FOR DENMARK AND SWEDEN TO CALL FOR TOUGH EU MEASURES AGAINST TEHRAN BECAUSE THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO PAY AN ECONOMIC PRICE AS ITALY WOULD.

#### OPENLY SEEKING BUSINESS WITH IRAQ

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16. (C) ITALY IS LOOKING TO POSITION ITSELF COMMERCIALLY IN BAGHDAD -- THE MOMENT UN SANCTIONS ARE LIFTED. THE MFA LIKES TO REMIND US THAT IRAQ WAS AN IMPORTANT TRADING PARTNER AND ENERGY SOURCE FOR ITALY BEFORE THE GULF WAR. OVER THE LAST MONTH, TWO HIGH-PROFILE IRAQI DELEGATIONS HAVE VISITED ROME, OSTENSIBLY TO DISCUSS PERMITTED COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES UNDER UNSCR 986 (REFS F-G). IRAQI OIL MINISTER AMIR RASHID WAS THE MOST NOTABLE VISITOR. FM DINI AND INDUSTRY MINISTER BERSANI MET RASHID AFTER "PRESSURE" FROM ITALIAN OIL INTERESTS AND IRAQ, ACCORDING TO MFA ECONOMIC DG DI ROBERTO; RASHID ALSO CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT OF PARASTATAL PETROLEUM PRODUCER AGIP. DI ROBERTO AND INDUSTRY DG FOR BASIC ENERGY ETTORE ROSSONI SAID RASHID'S DISCUSSIONS INCLUDED NOT ONLY UNSCR 986, BUT POST-SANCTIONS OIL IMPORTS AND NEW OIL PRODUCTION FACILITIES IN IRAQ.

17. (C) IRAQ'S DEPUTY OIL MINISTER -- SAMI SHARUF SHEBAB --

FOLLOWED UP RASHID'S VISIT WITH A SERIES OF MAY 14 MEETINGS WITH ITALIAN BUSINESSMEN AND PARLIAMENTARIANS. U/S PATRICIA TOIA SAW SHEBAB AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BUT, ACCORDING TO AN MFA SOURCE, DECLINED TO ATTEND A LATER PRESS CONFERENCE WITH SHEBAB AS SCHEDULED DUE TO HIS "ABRASIVENESS" DURING THE MEETING. THIS SOURCE CALLED SHEBAB "AGGRESSIVE" IN HIS INSISTENCE THAT ITALY DO AS MUCH AS FRANCE, CHINA AND RUSSIA TO HAVE SANCTIONS LIFTED. NONETHELESS, TOIA REPORTEDLY TOLD SHEBAB THAT SHE WELCOMED ADDITIONAL IRAQI DELEGATIONS.

¶18. (C) THE GOI WOULD PROBABLY NOT OBJECT IF AGIP SIGNED AN EXPLORATION OR PRODUCTION CONTRACT WITH IRAQ WHILE UNSC SANCTIONS ARE IN PLACE, MFA OFFICIAL TRUPIANO TOLD ECOUNS JUNE 5, AS LONG AS THE CONTRACT DID NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE UNTIL THE SANCTIONS WERE LIFTED. TRUPIANO NOTED THAT FRENCH PRODUCER TOTAL HAD RECENTLY MADE JUST SUCH A DEAL WITH BAGHDAD. (NOTE: OFFICIALS FROM ENI, AGIP'S PARENT, TOLD ECOUNS JUNE 6 THEY WERE NOT AWARE THAT TOTAL HAD ACTUALLY SIGNED A DEAL WITH IRAQ.)

¶19. (C) THESE IRAQI VISITS FOLLOW ON THE HEELS OF THE OPENING OF AN ITALIAN INTERESTS SECTION IN BAGHDAD (REF H), AND THE FEELING AMONG ITALIAN FIRMS THAT THEY HAVE BEEN MISSING OUT ON FUTURE BUSINESS DEALS IN IRAQ UNDER UNSCR 986. ACCORDING TO TRUPIANO, ITALY HAS RECEIVED ONLY FOUR CONTRACTS OUT OF 355 APPROVED BY THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER UNSCR 986 -- ALL OF WHICH WENT TO A SINGLE PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY. TRUPIANO INDICATED THAT THIS SENSE OF UNFAIRNESS HAS CONTRIBUTED TO EXISTING "SANCTIONS FATIGUE" IN ITALY. THE GOI AND ITALIAN BUSINESS SEE THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE "GIANT" FRENCH INTEREST SECTION IN BAGHDAD AND THE LARGE NUMBER OF 986 CONTRACTS WON BY FRENCH FIRMS, TRUPIANO SAID; THE GOI ALSO CANNOT IGNORE THE REOPENING OF THE SPANISH EMBASSY THERE.

¶10. (C) PARLIAMENT HAS ALSO PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN SHAPING GOI POLICY TOWARD IRAQ. ON APRIL 15, THE SENATE PASSED MOTIONS CALLING ON THE GOI TO UNDERTAKE INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE LIVING CONDITIONS THERE (REF K). ON MAY 14, U/S TOIA MET WITH A GROUP OF SENATORS FROM ACROSS POLITICAL LINES WHO WANTED TO KNOW WHAT THE GOI WAS DOING IN RESPONSE TO THE MOTIONS. A GROUP OF SEVEN AN PARLIAMENTARIANS VISITED IRAQ MAY 24 - 27, EVEN MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ; LARGER PARLIAMENTARY AND BUSINESS DELEGATIONS ARE SCHEDULED JUNE 22 -27, AND JULY 5 - 10 RESPECTIVELY. "NEA" ECONOMIC DEPUTY DIRECTOR FEDERICO FAILLA SAID THERE WAS STRONG SENTIMENT AMONG THE POLITICAL LEFT AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN FAVOR OF EASING IRAQI SUFFERING, ESPECIALLY AMONG CHILDREN. HE COMMENTED THAT IT WOULD BE A "BIG" [DOMESTIC] POLITICAL MISTAKE TO SHOW INSENSITIVITY TOWARD THIS SUFFERING. "NEA" POLITICAL DEPUTY BRASIOLI AGREED, CALLING THE ITALIAN URGE TO ASSIST THE IRAQI PEOPLE AS BOTH "CULTURAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL." HE NOTED THE "HUNDREDS OF LETTERS" THE MFA RECEIVES EACH MONTH URGING THE GOVERNMENT TO DO SOMETHING.

ITALY IS LIBYA'S "FIRST PARTNER ECONOMICALLY"

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¶11. (C) ITALY CONSIDERS ITSELF LIBYA'S "FIRST PARTNER" ECONOMICALLY AND IS THE WORLD'S LARGEST EXPORTER TO THE COUNTRY, ACCOUNTING FOR 21 PERCENT (USD 1.2 BILLION) OF ITS TOTAL 1995 IMPORTS. THE MFA'S TRUPIANO SAYS ITALY WANTS TO NARROW ITS USD 3 BILLION ANNUAL TRADE DEFICIT WITH LIBYA. MFA ECONOMIC DG DI ROBERTO AND "NEA" ECONOMIC DIRECTOR TRUPIANO TRAVELLED TO TRIPOLI THE WEEK OF MAY 18-24. THE NUMBER ONE AGENDA ITEM WAS LIBYAN REPAYMENT OF CIRCA USD 1 BILLION IN OUTSTANDING DEBT. IN PREPARATION, ITALIAN AND LIBYAN NEGOTIATORS MET MAY 15 TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION -- THE FIRST TIME THE LIBYANS HAVE AGREED TO SUCH MEETINGS. TRUPIANO TOLD ECOUNS JUNE 5 THAT HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT A TECHNICAL MEETING THE WEEK OF JUNE 9 COULD MAKE PROGRESS THAT MIGHT ALLOW THE REPAYMENT OF ABOUT HALF THE OUTSTANDING PRINCIPAL "SOON." DG DI ROBERTO, HOWEVER, SAID HE WAS FAR LESS SANGUINE THAT ITALY WOULD SEE REPAYMENTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

¶12. (C) BEFORE LEAVING FOR TRIPOLI, TRUPIANO HAD TOLD EMBOFFS THAT LIBYA CONTINUALLY ASKS ITALY TO EXPAND THE BILATERAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP; ITALY REFUSES TO DO SO, HOWEVER,

UNTIL LIBYA MAKES GOOD ON ITS DEBT. STILL, ITALY IS ANXIOUS FOR LIBYA TO RE-JOIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -- AND HAS TOLD LIBYAN OFFICIALS THAT IT WILL HELP, IF LIBYA FIRST HELPS ITSELF. THE MFA FEELS THAT QADDHAFI HAS INDEED "CHANGED" AND USES AS EVIDENCE HIS ATTENDANCE AT THE JUNE 1996 ARAB SUMMIT IN CAIRO, HIS MORE "HUMANITARIAN" ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY IN LIBYA AND HIS "COOPERATION" WITH RECENT EGYPTIAN INSPECTION TEAMS AT TARHUNAH. ITALIAN MFA OFFICIALS CITE STEADY PRESSURE TO HELP GET THE SANCTIONS LIFTED FROM MAGHREB STATES, ALL OF WHOM REPORTEDLY BELIEVE QADDHAFI HAS TURNED A NEW LEAF.

¶13. (C) ITALY WILL NOT ALTER ITS DEPENDENCE ON LIBYAN OIL; REPLACING IT WOULD BE COSTLY IN TERMS OF LOST INVESTMENTS, HIGHER PETROLEUM PRICES, AND FUTURE TRADE TIES. IN FACT, ITALIAN DEPENDENCE ON LIBYAN ENERGY COULD INCREASE BY EARLY NEXT CENTURY, WHEN LIBYA COULD SUPPLY EIGHT PERCENT OF ITALY'S NATURAL GAS. STATE-OWNED AGIP -- THE LARGEST FOREIGN OIL COMPANY IN LIBYA -- IS POISED TO BUILD A GAS PIPELINE BETWEEN LIBYA AND SICILY WHICH MAY GO INTO OPERATION IN THE YEAR 2000. CONSTRUCTION HAS NOT YET STARTED DUE, WE BELIEVE, TO AGIP AND GOI UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE IRAN-LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT, BUT ARE NOT SANGUINE THAT THE PROJECT WILL BE PUT OFF FOREVER.

¶14. (C) WITH LIBYA, AS WITH THE OTHER "ROGUES," WE CAN EXPECT ITALY TO OBSERVE THE LETTER OF THE LAW WITH REGARD TO UNSC-MANDATED SANCTIONS, BUT NOT GO AN INCH FURTHER. ITALY CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO INTERPRET GRAY AREAS OF SANCTIONS RESOLUTIONS IN LIBYA'S FAVOR, AS IT DID WITH REGARD TO THE INVESTMENT OF LIBYAN OIL REVENUES IN UNBLOCKED ITALIAN ACCOUNTS (REF L).

COMMENT: A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE ON ROGUES  
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¶15. (C) THE ITALIANS KNOW THAT WE ARE IRRITATED BY THEIR CLOSE TIES WITH THE "ROGUES," AND POLITELY DISAGREE WITH MANY OF OUR POLICY PROPOSALS. THE POWER OF THESE DISAGREEMENTS IS THAT THEY ARISE FROM A DEEP BELIEF AND A PROFOUND NEED, ONE PHILOSOPHICAL, THE OTHER COMMERCIAL.

¶16. (C) PHILOSOPHICALLY, THE ITALIANS, LIKE MANY OF THEIR EUROPEAN COUNTERPARTS, BELIEVE THAT DIALOGUE, RATHER THAN ISOLATION, IS THE KEY TO MODERATING THE BEHAVIOR OF PROBLEM STATES. THE GOI DOES HAVE A "ROGUE STATES" POLICY, AN MFA CONTACT TOLD POLOFF RECENTLY, AND DINI SPELLED IT OUT IN THE "ENERGY" ARTICLE (PARA 4). COMMERCIALY, ITALIANS HAVE REAL, SUBSTANTIAL BUSINESS INTERESTS IN THESE COUNTRIES THAT WOULD BE PUT AT RISK BY POLICIES MORE TO OUR LIKING. ADOPTING A US-STYLE POLICY OF ISOLATION WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE REPAYMENT OF AT LEAST USD 5 BILLION IN OUTSTANDING DEBTS FROM IRAN AND LIBYA, AND REQUIRE THE COUNTRY TO FIND A NEW SOURCE FOR NEARLY HALF ITS PETROLEUM IMPORTS (REF P). IN ADDITION, DESPITE A USD 60 BILLION WORLDWIDE TRADE SURPLUS IN 1996, THE GOI CLEARLY FEELS DRIVEN TO BRING MORE BALANCE TO TRADE ACCOUNTS WITH OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES WHERE IT SEES LARGE DEFICITS. IT THUS WOULD NOT WANT TO TAKE ANY STEPS THAT MIGHT WORSEN THE ENVIRONMENT FOR INCREASING ITALIAN EXPORTS TO THESE STATES.

¶17. (C) THE ITALIANS INSIST THAT THEY ARE NOT "DOING ANYTHING" TO VIOLATE COMMITMENTS MADE WITHIN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS. HOWEVER, IN THE WAKE OF EU FURY OVER ILSA AND HELMS-BURTON, THEY HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY WILLING TO CHARACTERIZE U.S. POLICIES OF ISOLATION AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AS "IRRECONCILABLE" AND MISGUIDED AND TO ARGUE AGAINST SUCH WITHIN THE EU. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOI'S UNDISGUISED OPENNESS IN LOOKING FOR A COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO THE "PAN AM PROBLEM," AND TO PROMOTING ALTERNATIVES, AS IT DID AT THE RECENT WORKING GROUP MEETING IN BRUSSELS MAY 24, EXPLAIN QADDHAFI'S PERSISTENT USE OF ITALY AS LIBYA'S INTERLOCUTOR WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IRAN HAS NEVER GONE OFF THE GOI'S RADAR, AND AS MFA OFFICIALS PUT IT "THE GERMANS ARE JUST AS ANXIOUS TO GO BACK AS WE ARE!" THE JUNE 2 GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL DECISION TO CONTINUE TO INDEFINITELY POSTPONE THE RETURN OF EU AMBASSADORS WILL REQUIRE AL EU PARTNERS TO WAIT A LITTLE LONGER FOR THE BRIGHTER RELATIONSHIP THEY ENVISION WITH NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENT KHATAMI.

